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The Naval Telecommunications System (NTS), by achieving connectivity through
various networks, provides record communications within the Navy. This service is
provided to a wide variety of users with different requirements.
Currently, this service is provided without cost to the user. Because the service is
free, there is no overt incentive to economize on its use. This may be one reason for an
increase in message volume in past years. As a result of the overwhelming demand for
record communications, the Naval Telecommunication System has experienced periods
of delay in delivering messages to their destination.
This thesis looks at how prices could be used as a demand management tool, to
ensure messages reach their destination as prescribed by the originator. It also proposes
a cost estimation model which, if implemented, could provide justifiable cost based
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The Naval Telecommunications System (NTS), by achieving connectivity through
various networks, provides record communications within the Navy. The Naval
Telecommunications System provides service to a wide variety of users, with different
requirements.
Currently, this service is provided without cost to the user. Because the service is
free, there is no overt incentive to economize on its use. This may be one reason for an
increase in message volume in past years. As a result of the overwhelming demand for
record communications, the Naval Telecommunication System has experienced periods
of delay in delivering messages to their destination.
Charging a command for use of the NTS may be an effective tool to manage the
demand for record communications.
B. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The object of this thesis is to examine alternative pricing mechanisms to manage
demand and increase the efficiency of the NTS. Pricing will give users incentives to
economize on the number, destination, length, and precedence of messages sent. This
would allow the managers of the NTS to concentrate on primary missions, as opposed
to reactive measures during periods of high demand.
To meet this objective the following questions were explored:
• How is demand currently managed for record communications?
• What are the possible pricing mechanisms?
• What effect would each pricing mechanism have on the demand for record
communications?
• What costs are associated with record communications?
C. SCOPE
This thesis is an analysis of what pricing mechanisms could be used to effectively
and efficiently manage the demand for record communications. Additionally, a cost
estimation model for collecting and accounting for costs of record communications is
proposed to provide the data necessary to implement the appropriate pricing
mechanism(s). This thesis will help establish the framework for pricing as a demand
management tool. Ascertaining a precise dollar price would require modeling the
complexities of the NTS system and collecting a vast amount of cost and demand data.
which exceeds the scope of this thesis.
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This chapter provided an introduction to demand management for record
communications. Chapter Two looks at economic concepts and theory. Chapter Three
applies the economic concepts and theory to record communications. It also analyzes
the effectiveness of current demand procedures. Chapter Four summarizes pricing
mechanisms that are appropriate when demand exceeds supply. Chapter Five discusses
a cost estimation framework and model for record communications used in collecting
data necessary to implement pricing mechanisms. The last chapter provides the
conclusions of this thesis and suggests areas for further studv.
II. DEMAND MANAGEMENT: ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
A. INTRODUCTION
Demand management is the practice of equating expected demand and expected
supply, without causing a surplus or excess demand. It is the application of
microeconomics, the study of scarce resource allocations. The capacity for record
communications is a scarce resource, as users want to send more messages than the
communications system can deliver within the designated speed of service. Thus,
management of record communications can be viewed from the framework of
microeconomics.
This chapter establishes the economic framework and defines economic concepts
with respect to demand management. This chapter also summarizes how demand is
managed in the private sector.
B. CONCEPTS AND THEORY
1. Demand
Demand is the quantity of a good or service that consumers are willing and able
to purchase at specified prices. It reflects the value or benefit of the good or service to
the consumer. As price changes, the quantity the consumer is willing and able to
purchase also changes. Similarly, value or benefit changes. Demand may be represented
in a graph, with axes of quantity, and price or dollars per unit (see Figure 1). Demand,
or the demand curve, represents the additional value or benefit gained when the user
receives more unit. This is referred to as the marginal value or marginal benefit.
The demand for a good or service is assumed to be based on various factors
such as price of the good, taste, and income. These factors are the determinants of
demand. Demand may change if any of the determinants change. There are two types
of changes: movements along the demand curve and shifts in the demand curve.
If only the price of the good changes, the quantity demanded by the consumer
will also change. This is represented by a movement along the demand curve. In
Figure 1, a change in price from P to F will cause a movement along demand D,
quantity demanded changes from Q to Q. The law of demand states that "consumers
are willing and able to buy more of a good the lower the price of a good, when all other
variables are held constant." [Ref 1: p. 13]
Figure 1. Demand
A change of any determinant except price, shifts the demand to a new
relationship between quantity and price. A shift in demand, represented by D to Dl in
Figure 1 on page 4, changes the quantity demanded at price P from Q to Ql. [Ref. 2:
p. 18-27]
2. Supply
Supply is the amount of a good or service that a group of suppliers or firms
would be willing to offer at given prices. It reflects the cost (actual and opportunity) to
supply that good or service. Like demand, supply may be represented in a graph (see
Figure 2 on page 5). It represents the marginal cost, the additional cost to produce one
more unit.
The supply for a good or service is assumed to be based on various factors such
as price, technology, and price of inputs. Supply changes if any of the factors of supply
change. There are two types of changes in supply: movement along the supply curve










If only the price of the good changes, the quantity supplied will also change.
This is represented by a movement along the supply curve. As price changes from P to
P' on the supply curve 5 (Figure 2 on page 5), the quantity supplied changes from O to
Q. The law of supply states, "the higher the price of a good or service the more will be
offered for sale." [Ref. 1: p. 58]
A change in any factor except price, shifts supply to a new relationship between
quantity and price. A shift in supply, represented by 5 to S' in Figure 2, may be
attributable to a change in the price of inputs or technology. [Ref. 2: p. 18-29]
3. Market Equilibrium
Market equilibrium exists when the quantity demanded equals the quantity
supplied. At price Pe, in Figure 3 on page 6, consumers demand quantity Qe, and
suppliers will supply quantity Qe. Excess demand or surplus exists when current price
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Figure 3. Market Equilibrium
If the current price is below equilibrium price, there is excess demand;
consumers are willing and able to purchase more than suppliers are willing to supply.
At price Px, in Figure 3 on page 6, consumers demand quantity Qcx, but suppliers
produce only quantity Qsx. When the current price is above equilibrium price, surplus
exists; consumers are unwilling or unable to purchase the amount suppliers produce.
At price Ps, in Figure 3, consumers demand only quantity Qcs, and suppliers produce
quantity Qss. [Kef. 2: p. 36]
Barring any external forces, such as a limited supply, the market will
automatically converge to the equilibrium price. This requires that price and quantity-
be perfectly variable to the shifts in supply or demand. If price and quantity cannot
vary, excess demand and/or a surplus can be expected. For instance, in Figure 4 on
page 7, if the capacity of a system was fixed at Qc (quantity is not perfectly variable) and
demand shifted from D to Dl, equilibrium price would increase to capacity price. Pc.












Figure 4. Expected Excess Demand
capacity Qc. However, if the price was always set at price Pe (price is not perfectly
variable), and demand shifted to Dl
t
an excess demand ofW Qc exists.
4. Efficiency
Efficiency implies that the maximum benefit for both consumers and suppliers
is derived. Efficiency can be accomplished in two ways: maximizing the benefits from
a given amount of resources or by minimizing the resources used for a given amount of
benefits [Ref. 1: p. 13]. As long as marginal benefits exceed marginal costs, the consumer
and, or the supplier is getting more benefit for less cost. This continues until marginal
cost equals marginal benefit; after that point marginal cost exceeds marginal benefit and
the consumer and; or supplier is paying more than the benefits received. Thus, efficiency
is maximized when marginal benefits are equal to marginal costs. [Ref. 2: p. 53, 107]
If demand and supply accurately measure all benefits and costs, efficiency is
maximized at market equilibrium. However, if price and quantity cannot automatically
adjust, creating surplus or excess demand, efficiency will not be maximized at
equilibrium. In situations of excess demand, the consumers with the highest marginal
benefits must be served first to maximize efficiency. In situations of surplus, suppliers
using the cheapest resources (minimizing costs) will lead to efficiency.
Additionally, if all costs are not captured or perceived in supply or demand,
market equilibrium will not result in efficiency. For example, if the administrative costs
for running government programs are not perceived by the consumer, supply will
indicate a lower marginal cost. In Figure 5, the observance of supply Si, results in an
incorrect equilibrium; price at, Pi, and quantity demanded, Qi. The "true" supply is St,
which means the quantity demanded, Qi is produced at a marginal cost of Cmc, which
is in excess of marginal benefit. To maximize efficiency, only the quantity, Qe should











Figure 5. Inefficiency at Equilibrium
5. Demand Management Practices
Demand management is the practice of equating demand and supply. It is used
i situations where the market cannot automatically adjust to the equilibrium price (i.e.,
price or quantity constraint) or when consumers do not perceive the appropriate demand
or supply (i.e., impulse buying or government discounts).
Prices are used in the private sector to manage the demand for a good or service.
In situations of excess demand and an inability to increase the supply, or when true cost
is not perceived, pricing mechanisms targeted at access or use are employed. Typically,
targeting access effects use and vice versa. For instance, restricting access produces
fewer users and use may drop. Also, if the marginal cost of using the good or service is
low (high), consumers may desire more (less) access.
a. Access
Limiting access to a good or service may be accomplished by charging users
a hook-up fee. Admission into a museum for an unspecified amount of time and a
monthly service charge for a telephone connection which is paid regardless of level of
use are examples of a hook-up fee pricing mechanism.
b. Use
Several pricing mechanisms are used to manage the use of a good or service.
The appropriate mechanism(s) is based on the predictability and duration of excess
demand.
When demand is consistently greater than supply, average cost or marginal
cost pricing is used. Public utility pricing is based on these mechanisms. If demand is
greater than supply in predictable periods, peak load pricing is appropriate. Long
distance telephone rates, based on time of day day of week, are an example of peak load
pricing. Finally, when excess demand is random, priority pricing is most efficient. Price
discounts for interruptible utility service is an example of priority pricing. Pricing
mechanisms are discussed in Chapter Four.
III. DEMAND MANAGEMENT FOR RECORD COMMUNICATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The capacity for record communications is a scarce resource, as users want to send
more messages than the communications system can deliver within the designated speed
of service. Thus, management of record communications can be viewed from the
framework of microeconomics.
This chapter applies the economic concepts and theory to record communications.
This chapter also examines how demand is currently managed, and the effectiveness of
the management practices.
B. RECORD COMMUNICATIONS APPLICATION
1. Demand
The demand for record communications could be viewed as the number of
messages users desire to send. Any individual authorized to draft, release and/or process
electronically transmitted messages is a user. The user decides how to complete each





• Special handling requirements
• Administrative designation
Figure 6. Elements of a Message
Some determinants of the demand for record communications are listed in
Figure 7 on page 1 1 [Ref. 4: p. 86]. The demand for record communications will change
if there is a change in any of the determinants other than price. This change in demand
would be represented by a shift in the demand curve. Currently, the service is priced at
zero. Therefore, users will demand service as long as they receive any positive benefit
from usinc record communications.





Business connection with organization called
Mission requirements
Defense condition (posture)
Relative echelon chain- of-command.
Figure 7. Proposed Determinants of Navy Demand for Communications
2. Supply
The Naval Telecommunications System is the "firm" that supplies the service
of record communications. It is a complex of equipment and facilities that provides a
telecommunications network for the operation, command and control, and
administration of the Navy. [Ref. 5]
The service is accomplished by accepting a message from the user, transmitting
it to the servicing telecommunications center(s), and delivering it to the appropriate
addresses. Each of these steps may be viewed as a queuing situation. The characteristics
of queuing situations are listed in Figure 8 on page 12 [Ref. 6: p. 566]. Messages arrive
randomly at a telecommunications center in a physical (i.e., paper) or electrical format.
Processing time, at this step, depends on the length and format of the message. In the
other steps, transmission and delivery, processing time is uncertain and arrival random
for similar reasons. The fixed capacity of the NTS at each step and the random arrival
times of messages may cause congestion. Extensive congestion leads to a delay of
message deliver}'. Additionally, because the NTS uses a priority queuing system (i.e.,
higher precedence messages are processed first, delaying lower precedence messages), the
precedence level assigned further impacts delay of delivery.
3. Market Equilibrium
Market equilibrium for record communications may be considered the point at
which the number of messages sent (demand) equals the ability of the NTS to deliver
those messages as requested (supply) without underutilization. The speed of service
• Arrivals require service.
• Demand for service (timing and quantity)
is uncertain.
• Service facilities, or servicers, perform the service.
• Duration of service is uncertain.
• Behavior of arrivals, as they arrive and/or wait, is uncertain.
Figure 8. Characteristics of a Queue Situation
requested (precedence level) is the most difficult to meet because the NTS is a
congestion-based system. Thus, the amount of congestion dictates market equilibrium.
Factors contributing to congestion and delay are:
• Number of messages (including number of addees);
• Length of message;
• Precedence level assigned;
• Arrival rate at telecommunications centers (volume within a time period); and
• Speed of processing.
To illustrate the effect of these factors, the queue situation of a message
awaiting transmission is used. Assume the speed of transmission is ten characters per
second. One message of 60 characters and two messages of 30 characters would take six
seconds to be transmitted. Suppose Message A is in line when Message B arrives.
Message B is 40 characters long and has a higher precedence, so it goes to the head of
the line. Message A must now wait an additional four seconds before transmission
because of the precedence level. The rate in which messages arrive at the message center
has a dramatic effect on delay. If twenty messages of 100 characters each with the same
precedence arrive at the message center simultaneously, they would be transmitted one
right after the other. The first message, assuming no other messages are in line, would
take ten seconds whereas the last would be delayed 200 seconds. The average delay for
the 20 messages is 105 seconds. If the same messages arrived at the message center in
intervals often seconds, each would only take ten seconds (assuming no other messages
in line) for transmission, because each message was the first in line. The average delay
for the 20 messages would be ten seconds.
If any of these factors: number, length, precedence, arrival rate, or speed of
processing; were changed, the amount of congestion and expected delay would change.
Excess demand exists when the number of messages sent, are not delivered in
the time requested. Excess demand can be identified by a backlog of messages (i.e..
paper format) awaiting entry into the NTS, high circuit utilization (mean arrival rate
divided by mean service rate)i
,
and a backlog in reproduction and local distribution.
A surplus exists when the capability to send, exceeds the requested service. Surplus can
be identified by idle telecommunication centers, low utilization, and idle circuits.
Excess demand and surplus may be apparent to the suppliers of record
communications by activity level alone. The users, however, may be unaware of excess
demand or surplus caused by congestion. Users deliver their messages to a message
center and leave. They may be totally unaware of the volume, length, or precedence of
messages, other than their own. that are arriving at the message center. This gives
reason to believe, that users do not perceive the actual marginal cost (both operation
and congestion) of providing record communications or supply.
Assuming equilibrium exists where messages are delivered in the time requested
with no under utilization. NTS would not normally be in equilibrium because price and
quantity cannot automatically adjust to equilibrium. In Figure 9 on page 14, demand
for record communications is assumed to be D and supply is assumed to be S. To be in
equilibrium quantity demanded would be Oe. If price is set at zero, excess demand of
Q - Qe exists. Excess demand results in delay of messages. If demand shifts, to DL due
to the defense posture, or another period of peak demand, the over all effect is further
delay in messages.
Because the price for sending a message is zero, and quantity cannot always be
adjusted, excess demand can be expected.
4. Efficiency
Efficiency implies that the maximum benefit for both users and suppliers is
derived. Thus to maximize efficiency, messages must be delivered in order of highest to
lowest marginal benefits. Furthermore, service should not be requested for messages
where the total marginal cost exceeds the marginal benefit. To ensure this, both the
1 On a per message basis, mean arrival rate is the number of messages times the average
number of characters. Utilization computed on System Reporting Processing Report (SRPA)
reports uses a 24 hour period. It may be calculated by first computing the mean arrival rate of
characters per second [ (number of messages per 24 hours) times (the average length) divided by
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Figure 9. Demand for Record Communications
operating costs of providing record communications and the effect of congestion must
be recognized by the user. Maximizing efficiency for record communications is difficult
because price and quantity cannot automatically adjust to equilibrium, and all costs
(e.g., congestion) may not be perceived by the user. This requires use of demand
management.
5. Demand Management Practices
Demand management practices are necessary to maximize efficiency in
situations where demand and supply will not normally be in equilibrium and/ or when
all benefits or costs are not captured or perceived. Both situations are evident in record
communications. Two areas that demand management for record communications must
address are: congestion (because users do not perceive the cost of congestion) and
marginal benefit received from messages.
In dealing with congestion, demand management practices for record
communication could be focused on either access or use. Due to the need of universal
access for record communications, access is dismissed as a demand management
alternative.
-
As discussed above, factors contributing to congestion and delay are:
• Number of messages (including number of addees);
• Length of message;
• Precedence level assigned;
• Rate messages arrive at telecommunications centers (volume within a time period);
and
• Speed of processing.
Speed of processing is a factor of supply. The remaining factors are determined by the
user and are targets for demand management.
Currently, messages are not identified in terms of marginal value. However,
they are identified by how fast they must be delivered (i.e., precedence level).
C. CURRENT DEMAND MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES
Administrative procedures are used to manage the demand for record
communications. The primary procedures are published in the Navy
Telecommunications Users Manual (NTP 3) and Chief of Naval Operations'
directives. 3
1. The Navy Telecommunications Users Manual (NTP 3)
NTP 3 [Ref. 3] targets three factors that contribute to congestion and delay:
length, precedence, and volume. Guidance is given regarding brevity of text and
precedence assignment. Volume is addressed by requiring personnel with "release
authority'' to determine if the message qualifies (qualification is based on other
directives) for electrical transmission or whether it should be sent via the postal system.
Additionally, NTP 3 provides for forced management of demand when emergency
situations require reduction of telecommunications to a particular area. This situation
is referred to as Minimize. [Ref. 3]
2 Access as a demand management tool, applied to particular communications systems, is the
thesis of Psillas [Ref. 7].
3 Administrative Intercept, broadcast preparation and similar programs do not impact the
number of messages users send. They attempt to equate demand and supply without influencing
the user's demand. This discussion is focused at effecting the user's behavior.
2. Chief of Naval Operations' Directives
Beginning in April 1985, directives requiring the reduction of message volume
being electronically transmitted were issued. The directives include:
• NAVOP 142 85 Mailed Message Pilot Program
• NAVOP 069 86 Navy Mailed Message Program
• NAVOP 116 86 Communications Discipline
• OPNAVNOTE 2300 of 11 December 1986, Communications
Discipline
• NAVOP 013 89 Communications Discipline
These directives emphasize a need for message volume reduction, provide an alternative
to record communication (e.g., Navy Mailed Message Program (NAVGRAM)), and
require commands to establish programs to meet volume restrictions [Refs. 8, 9 , 10 &
11]. The latest directive, [Ref. 12] states:
The 1989 goal is a five percent reduction in message traffic. Success in
communications discipline can be achieved, as has been proven in numerous fleet
exercises, through application of established principles and procedures. Proper
assignment of precedence, intelligent determination of addees, generous use of
abbreviations in consideration of brevity, identification of the message as admin, and
the decision to send it as a NAVGRAM when appropriated are some of the basics
that when uniformly applied ensure efficient use of communications circuits.
D. EFFECTIVENESS OF DEMAND MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES
Two measures of effectiveness of current demand management procedures are:
• Does demand management target congestion?
• Is the market in equilibrium?
1. Demand Management Targets
Demand management procedures for record communications should be focused
on congestion and delay. Users control four factors contributing to delay:
• Number of messages (including number of addees);
• Precedence assignment;
• Message length: and
• Arrival rate of messages at a telecommunications center (volume within a time
period).
As indicated by NAVOP 013/89, current administrative procedures target the
number of messages, precedence assignment and message length. Data indicates that
administrative policies to control message volume have achieved a degree of success.
The total number of messages accounted for in the Naval Communications Processing
and Routing System (NAVCOMPARS) and the Local Digital Message Exchange
(LDMX) are shown in Figure 10. It suggests message growth began tapering ofT in
1985, which coincides with the CNO directives. Historical data pertaining to precedence
assignment and message length was not found.
Figure 10. Volume of Transmitted Messages (Annual)
Volume of messages in specific time periods, such as time of the day or day of
the week, has not been a target in recent demand management procedures.
Telecommunications centers experience an increase in outgoing message traffic
coincident with the end of the work week, end of the month, and end of the work day
[Ref. 13]. The backlog of message volume by hour for a Fleet Broadcast channel, and
the day of the week totals for an Automatic Digital Information Network (AUTODIN)
channel, both compiled from [Ref. 14] reveal similar indications. See Figure 11 on page
18 and Figure 12 on page 19. Additionally, message volume may randomly increase as
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Figure 11. Transmitted Messages (Day of the Week)
2. Market Equilibrium
The supply and demand for record communications is not always in equilibrium.
A snapshot comparison of messages delivered over a ten day period over three different
circuits, a Fleet Broadcast (FBC) channel, a Common User Digital Information
Exchange (CUD1X) special subscriber, and an AUTOD1N channel, illustrates this point
(Ref. 14]. Displayed in Table 1 on page 22, Table 2 on page 23, and Table 3 on page
24, is the utilization rate, average length and number of messages (total and by
precedence) and the average delivery time by precedence. Table 1 breaks the number
of messages by precedence into those that met and exceeded speed of service objectives.
The tables illustrate four important points: average length and number of messages
effect the utilization rate, the utilization rate effects the average delivery time, utilization
rate diifers among transmission medium and/or systems, and speed of service objectives
are not always met.
500
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Figure 12. Message Backlog by Hour
First, the average length and total number of messages effect the utilization rate.
For instance, in Table 1 the First Monday reported has an utilization rate of 88% with
373 messages of an average 2044 characters in length. The second Monday, utilization
increased six percent, primarily influenced by the 105 additional characters in length.
Secondly, the average delivery time increases as utilization rate increases. Table 1
displays utilization rates of 77-107%. The average delivery time for routine messages
varies from one and a half hours to over thirteen hours. Table 2 displays utilization rates
of 20-44% with an average delivery time for routine message of one to 17 minutes.
Thirdly, the tables also show a range of utilization rates for each transmission mode
(77-107% for FBC, 20-45% for AUTODIN, and 0-1% for CUDIX). This infers that
equilibrium for record communications is specific to transmission medium and/or
system. Finally, Table 1, illustrates that the speed of service objective is not consistently
met. Figure 13 on page 21, the number of messages that met and exceeded the speed
of service for the immediate messages on the Fleet Broadcast channel, (from Table 1
)
highlights this point.
The speed of delivery for the tables only reflects the elapsed time from receipt
at the NAVCOMPARS located at Norfolk, VA, to delivery of the message at its next
destination. This is the speed of service normally reviewed. However, as discussed
below, this may give an inaccurate picture of the actual speed of service messages
experience.
E. ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES
1. Data
The data available to determine if the NTS is meeting the speed of service
objectives is incomplete and misleading. Although available, the total elapsed time from
the writer's telecommunications center to the reader's telecommunications center is not
normally documented. Additionally, this elapsed time does not consider the potential
delay in reproduction and routing to the receiving command.
a. Entry into the NTS
The first possible point of delay, is when a message is accepted from the
user. Time of receipt from the user is time-stamped, and the time it entered into the
NTS (e.g., NAVCOMPARS) is recorded by the computers. The difference between
arrival at the message center and entry into the system, which may be significant, is not
normally recorded.
b. Transmission
The delay or time difference between entry and exit in the NAVCOMPARS,
provided the most concrete information regarding speed of delivery. This information,
however, was somewhat misleading because it is reported message delivery speed as an
average of all messages' delay. Average time of delay, as revealed in Table 1, distorts the
delivery speed of individual messages, giving the impression that speed of service
objectives are met. (NAVCOMPARS reports do not readily show the number of
messages that exceeded the speed of service objectives.) Comparing the average speed
of delivery for immediate messages, provided in Table 1, to the number of messages that
met and that exceeded the speed of service objective (in Table 1 or Figure 13 on page
21) reinforces this point.
The utilization rate reported in the SRPA reports is based on a 24-hour
period, thus not giving the proper indication of congestion at a given period of time.
An indication of congestion is given in message backlog (see Figure 12 on page 19).
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Figure 13. Messages Meeting and Exceeding Speed of Service Objective
However, only the number of messages, not number and length is reported in message
backlog.
c. Delivery
No record of the last step, delivery to the user, was found. The last recorded
time is a message's arrival at the servicing telecommunication center. The time it takes
for reproduction and distribution is not recorded.
2. Demand Management for Record Communications
Demand management is necessary to maximize the efficiency of the NTS,
because price and quantity cannot readily adjust to equilibrium, and because users may
not perceive the actual marginal cost of record communications. Current administrative
procedures are not sufficient to combat message delay. Although it appears by looking
at the average handling time that messages are delivered within the speed of service
objectives. Table 1 on page 22 and Figure 13 reflect that 31.5% of the messages in the
immediate precedence level over a ten day period on a FBC channel did not meet speed
of service objectives.
Table 1. FLEET BROADCAST CHANNEL: MESSAGE SUMMARY
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Pricing is the primary tool for demand management in the private sector. Various
pricing mechanisms are employed based on the relationship between supply and
demand. This chapter describes the pricing mechanisms used in situations where demand
exceeds supply. It discusses how each pricing mechanism could be applied to record
communications and the expected results.
B. SPECIFIC PRICING MECHANISMS
The appropriated pricing mechanism(s) is based on the predictability and duration
of excess demand. Cost-based pricing mechanisms are used to equate the expected
demand and expected supply. Demand-based pricing mechanisms are used in situations
where demand fluctuates. Congested systems may also apply a congestion-based pricing
mechanism.
1. Cost Based Pricing Mechanisms
a. Cost Definitions
Cost based pricing mechanisms are directly related to the actual cost of the
good or service. Several costs enter into the calculation of a cost-based price: fixed
costs, variable costs, average total cost, and marginal cost-* .
Fixed costs are those payments which must be made regardless of the
amount of production. For example, leased lines must be paid whether or not messages
traverse the line. Variable costs are payments to variable factors of production. As the
quantity of production increases, variable costs will also increase. Paper, used for
reproduction of messages, is a variable cost. Total cost is fixed costs plus variable costs.
The average total cost is the total cost divided by the quantity of production. Finally,
marginal cost is the change in total cost (fixed or variable) per unit change in output.
Marginal cost is the cost to send one more message. Figure 14 on page 26 illustrates
the typical relationship between average total cost (ATC) and marginal costs (MC).
[Ref. 2: p.271-276]
4 Marginal cost is represented in supply. Used in the context of one firm, the term marginal












Figure 14. Average and Marginal Cost Curves (representative)
b. Marginal Cost Pricing
Marginal cost pricing, considered a cornerstone of economic efficiency is
based on marginal cost [Ref. 15: pp. 13-14]. As illustrated in Figure 15 on page 27. the
price Pine, is the marginal cost at the quantity demanded Oinc. Marginal cost rates
provide the consumer a rational relationship to the actual cost of the product. The
supplier of the good should be indifferent to the quantity consumed, because the price
received covers the marginal cost to produce the good [Ref. 16: p. 66]. In situations of
decreasing costs, as illustrated in Figure 16 on page 28, suppliers realize a loss if
marginal cost pricing is used. The marginal cost price Pine per unit is lower than the
average total cost Cine incurred per unit.
Marginal cost pricing is difficult to apply when the commodity is supplied

















Figure 15. Marginal and Average Total Cost Pricing (representative)
29, is determined by the ability to give service within a time period. Capacity is exceeded
when the customers do not receive service within the time allotted. For instance,
capacity, at a restaurant, could be considered to seat and serve diners within 30 minutes.
Capacity is exceeded if customers must wait longer than 30 minutes. Customers can be
served in excess of capacity. If the quantity demanded exceeds capacity, to maximize
efficiency those with the highest marginal benefits must be served first. Thus, the
marginal cost at capacity, Pc, must be used vice the normal marginal cost to equate
demand and supply when capacity is reached.
c. Average Total Cost Pricing
In average cost pricing, price equals the average cost of the good or service
at the quantity demanded. In Figure 15, the price Pate, is the average total cost at
quantity demanded Qatc. The consumer, as in marginal cost pricing, is provided with a
Figure 16. Marginal and Average Total Cost Pricing (decreasing costs)
rational relationship of the cost of the good. However, average total cost pricing does
not provide incentives for suppliers to maximize efficiency. Suppliers recover all costs,
including underutilized fixed costs.
Average total cost pricing is less efficient than marginal cost pricing,
because the marginal cost does not equal the marginal benefit. As the quantity
demanded increases, with average total cost pricing (Qmc to Qatc), the marginal cost
also increases, {Pmc to Catc). The marginal cost Catc, may exceed marginal benefit Pate
in average total cost pricing as shown in Figure 15 on page 27. The resources to
produce the additional quantity demanded, could have been used more efficiently in a

















Figure 17. Marginal Cost Pricing at Capacity
In situations of decreasing costs (see Figure 16) suppliers are able to
recover all costs. However, efficiency is not maximized. The marginal cost of producing
the quantity demanded in average total cost pricing, Pate, is less than the required price.
2. Demand-based Pricing Mechanisms
Demand-based pricing mechanisms address shifts, or fluctuations, in demand.
Shifts which are predictable (i.e., end of the day or end of the month) use peak load
pricing. Random fluctuations are addressed with priority pricing.
a. Peak Load Pricing
Unlike the cost-based pricing mechanisms, peak load pricing addresses the
quantity demanded and the supply available within a particular time period. [Ref. 17:
p. 20] Peak load is the highest demand placed on a system during a period of time. If
system capacity is based on the peak load, off-peak hours imply lesser demand and an
underutilized capacity. If system capacity is set to satisfy requirements at off-peak













Figure 18. Peak Load Pricing
Peak load pricing, in essence, assigns different peak and off-peak prices to
equate demand and supply in both periods of time; and attempts to shift some of the use
from peak to oIT-peak periods stabilizing demand over time. In Figure 18 on page 30,
Dp and Dop illustrate peak load and oil-peak load demand, respectively. The peak load
price, Pp. equals the marginal cost at the quantity demanded, Op, at peak demand. The
off-peak price, Pop. equals the marginal cost at the quantity demanded, Oop, at the
ofT-peak demand. The peak load price is greater than ofT-peak price because marginal
costs typically increase as capacity is reached. 5 If only one price was assigned for both
peak and ofT-peak periods, efficiency would not be maximized. For instance, if the
off-peak price, Pop, was the sole priced used, during peak demand, Dp, excess demand
exists, and marginal cost (infinite) exceed marginal benefit, Pop. If the peak price Pp
5 Several peak load pricing models; such as those of Boiteux, Steiner, Williamson and
Buchana; attempt to formulate a price policy which leads to optimal amount of physical capacity
and is consistent with marginal social cost. Details on these models are available in (Refs. 15, 16
and 171.
was the sole price used, during off-peak demand, D, a surplus exists, with
underutilization of resources. Similar arguments can be made for any single price.
Peak load pricing discourages use in peak time. Ideally, consumers will
spread demand evenly over time, allowing requirements to be satisfied in all periods with
a lower system capacity.
b. Priority Pricing
Priority pricing addresses consumption of a commodity when peak demand
occurs randomly over time. Under a priority pricing scheme, users are offered a choice
of prices. When demand exceeds supply, users paying higher prices receive priority over
users paying lower prices. Thus, priority pricing provides a means to distinguish
consumers with high marginal benefits from those with a lower marginal benefits. When
system capacity is reached, efficiency can be maximized because the consumers with
higher marginal benefits can be served first.
As illustrated in Figure 19 on page 32, system capacity is established to
meet the quantity demanded at peak load times Op. If demand fluctuates from peak
demand. Dp. to a demand which exceeds system capacity, Dex, the consumers with the
highest marginal benefits can be served first. A priority pricing mechanism identifies,
by a pre-negotiated contract, which consumers should be served first in an effort to
maximize benefits. Electrical utilities who employ priority pricing give rebates to curtail
service, to a pre-specified level, during periods where demand exceeds capacity.
Customers allowing interruptible service are assumed to have lower marginal benefits.
Those with the highest marginal benefits receive service first: maximizing efficiency.
[Ref. 15: p. ISSj
Ideally, priority pricing identifies consumers with high marginal benefits
(maximizing total benefits) increasing system efficiency by ensuring that high value
consumers are served before lower valued consumers with a lower system capacity.
3. Congestion Based Pricing Mechanisms
a. Marginal delay cost
Marginal delay cost pricing is a dynamic method of setting prices. It
provides a means to capture the otherwise unperceived effect of congestion. A basis for
marginal delay cost pricing is time. Delay is assigned a monetary amount, on a per unit
basis (i.e., second): SV = per unit time delay. Marginal delay cost curves may be
computed for the delay, typically unperceived by the consumer, incurred because of
consestion.
Figure 19. Priority Pricing
Dolan [Ref. IS: pp. 18-21] explains and shows the relationship of perceived
delay cost ' PDC
') , marginal delay cost to the system (SMC), and marginal delay cost to
others (MCO) Figure 20 on page 33 illustrates the relationship of PDC, SMC and MCO
for various utilization rates. £> Perceived delay cost (PDC) is the delay cost to an
individual, for remaining in line for service. Mathematically, it is the expected average
time waiting in queue. Marginal delay cost to the system (SMC) is the total effect of
delay cost to the system. It is the derivative of the expected aggregate waiting time of
users. Marginal delay cost to others (MCO) is the delay cost to all others in the line,
incurred from the additional person waiting for service. Marginal delay cost to others
is the difference of marginal delay cost to the system and perceived delay
6 Illustrated is a MM 1 situation, single server with a Poisson arrival rate, and exponential
service. Although not identical to the NTS queue (preemptive priority) with a Poisson arrival rate,
and exponential service, it illustrates the effects of system delay.
cost (MCO = SMC - PDC). Normally, the MCO is unrecognized by the consumer.
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Figure 20. Marginal and Perceived Delay Cost Schedules
In terms of record communications, PDC is the user's perception of the
length of time Message A should normally be in queue awaiting transmission. MCO is
the effect to all other messages, due to Message A being transmitted. SMC is the total
effect of delay because of all messages transmitted. For instance, suppose a message
system normally had 20 messages in queue, each message was 100 characters long, and
the speed of transmission was ten characters per second. An instantaneous look at this
message system would reveal the following relationships between PDC, MCO and SMC.
If Message A was the seventh message in queue the PDC is 70 seconds, as that is the
length of time waiting in queue before transmission.? The MCO of Message A is the cost
of delay to the 13 messages waiting in queue after Message A. Those 13 messages (and
7 If users drop their messages off at a message center and leave (as typically happens) it is
possible that the PDC is less than proposed by Dolan because users do not experience the time
waiting in queue.
any additional message that arrives) will be delayed ten seconds for transmission of
Message A. Assuming no other messages arrive, the MCO is 130 seconds; which is part
of the total cost of transmitting Message A. Thus, the S.VIC for Message A is 200
seconds, the sum of V1CO and PDC.
The amount of delay is dependent on the utilization rate (mean arrival rate
divided by the mean service rate). Figure 20 on page 33 shows the dramatic impact, in
terms of time delay, of high utilization rates. As the utilization increases, the delay
increases at an increasing rate.
Figure 21 on page 35 [Ref. 18: p. 22], illustrates the perceived delay cost
(PDC) for a given utilization rate, and the resulting marginal delay cost to the system
(SMC). Dolan [Ref. 18: pp. 20-24] continues to explain that marginal delay cost pricing,
sets price Ps, at the quantity demanded at the system cost Qs, rather than at the quantity
demanded at the individual cost Qi, to maximize efficiency. If price was set at Pi, the
quantity demanded Qi, wrould cause an increase in system marginal delay to Ci The
marginal cost Ci, is greater than the marginal benefit Pi, decreasing efficiency.
C. PRICING MECHANISMS APPLIED TO RECORD COMMUNICATIONS
Assuming technology and mind-set permits a pricing strategy for record
communications, each pricing mechanism should elicit a different behavioral response
from users of record communications. As discussed in Chapter Two, congestion and
delay is dependent on the number of messages (including number of addees), the length
of a message, the rate of arrival (volume in a time period), and its assigned precedence.
Thus, to be an effective demand management tool, pricing mechanisms must give
incentive to the user to minimize the:
• Number of messages sent (including number of addees);
• Length of a message;
• Rate of arrival (number sent in a time period); and
• Precedence level assigned.
1. Cost Based Pricing
Marginal and average total cost pricing could be applied on either a per
characters
,
or a per message basis. Both mechanisms would receive similar responses
from the user, although greater efficiency would be realized with marginal cost pricing.
8 The basis could be taken down to a byte or bit level. Character will be used in reference to
















Figure 21. Marginal Delay Cost Pricing
If marginal or average total cost pricing were employed on a per message basis,
users would tend to send fewer messages. However, users may put more information
into a particular message, as opposed to sending more messages, which may increase the
length of a message. The rate of arrival and precedence assignment would not be
effected by the cost-based pricing mechanisms. Efficiency should improve because the
quantity demanded is reduced moving the system toward the point where marginal cost
and marginal benefit are equated. (Marginal cost and marginal benefit are equal in
marginal cost pricing.)
2. Demand Based Pricing
Employment of peak load pricing would result in a increase of price during
periods with higher demand (i.e., end of the day, end of the month). The rate could be
based on a per message or a per character basis. Indirectly, because the basis of charge
is the marginal cost, the number and/or length of the messages would be effected like
marginal or average total cost pricing. Because a higher price would be imposed during
peak hours, users would send only messages with higher marginal benefits. Thus, rate
of arrival to the communication center, during peak hours, should decrease, and perhaps
spread evenly over time. Precedence assignment would not be effected. Peak load
pricing allows greater efficiency, as marginal costs and marginal benefits are matched.
A priority rate could be applied, corresponding to the assigned precedence level
of a message. This implies increasing marginal benefits with increasing precedence
levels. A flash message would have a higher fee than a routine message. Additionally,
priority pricing could be applied to messages within each precedence level (i.e., all
routine messages). A rebate could be given to the users allowing other messages within
the same precedence level to be processed first. Indirectly, because the basis of charge
is marginal cost, the number and/or the length of the message would be effected like
marginal or average total cost pricing. Rate of arrival would not be effected. Users
would assign the minimum precedence level. Priority pricing allows the messages with
higher marginal benefits to be processed first, increasing efficiency.
3. Congestion Based Pricing
Marginal delay cost pricing provides a means to capture the otherwise
unperceived effect of congestion. A utilization rate to support the speed of service
objective with the corresponding perceived and marginal cost schedules would be
computed based on queuing theory. The unit used for the per unit delay cost could be
a character or a message. This would have the same effect on number or length of
messages as the cost-based pricing mechanisms. The arrival rate and precedence
assignment would not be effected. Marginal delay cost pricing allows the "true"
marginal cost of sending messages, in terms of congestion, to be used which will increase
efficiency.
4. Price Mechanism Summary
Each pricing mechanism accomplishes different objectives. The cost-based
pricing mechanisms capture all tangible costs associated with the providing record
communications. The demand-based pricing mechanisms are able to deal with
fluctuations in demand. Congestion-based pricing mechanisms capture the normally
unperceived cost of delay which is associated with record communications. Used
simultaneously, a price can be assigned which would capture all costs (tangible and
delay), and be able to deal with fluctuations in demand. Figure 22 on page 38 shows
how cost-based, demand-based, and congestion-based pricing mechanisms could be used
simultaneously. The costs include: marginal (operating) costs, MC, perceived delay
cost, PDC, and marginal delay cost to the system, SMC. Typical demand and a
fluctuation in demand are represented by D and Dl. Shown is the change in quantity
demanded as cost-based, and congestion-based pricing mechanisms are employed. For
demand D, with price at zero quantity demanded is Q*. Marginal cost pricing dictates
a quantity demanded, Qmc, at the corresponding price, Pmc. The effect of
congestion-based pricing is illustrated as price increases and quantity demanded
decreases with inclusion of perceived delay cost (Pp and Op) and increased again when
the marginal delay to others is added to get the marginal delay cost to the system (P and
O). Similarly, price and quantity demanded may be derived when demand fluctuates
from D to Dp.
The appropriate pricing mechanism and/or combinations of pricing mechanisms
depend on the characteristics of supply and demand. For instance, if the marginal cost
of operating the record communications system was insignificant, cost-based pricing
mechanisms would not be appropriate. If congestion was not a problem,
congestion-based pricing is unnecessary.
D. PRICE IMPLEMENTATION
To implement pricing, characteristics of supply, demand, and congestion must be
analyzed. The marginal cost of operating the record communication system, for each
transmission medium and system must be calculated. Characteristics of demand, such
as predictable peak and off-peak periods, must be determined. In terms of congestion,
the utilization rate (based on queuing theory) to give the optimum delivery rates must
be calculated. Also, a per unit delay dollar amount must be determined.
Q Q> Qmc
QUANTITY
Figure 22. Simultaneous Pricing Mechanisms
V. COST ESTIMATION
A. INTRODUCTION
One step in determining a justifiable cost-based or demand-based pricing mechanism
is determining the applicable costs. This chapter describes a basic framework for
identifying operating costs within the NTS, and a cost estimation model.
B. COST-BASED AND DEMAND-BASED PRICING MECHANISMS
To develop a pricing structure to achieve efficiency of the NTS, the marginal cost
(by message or character) of record communications must be determined. It is the basis
for both cost-based and demand-based pricing mechanisms. Cost-based pricing
mechanisms require identification of costs on the service life oC the system;
demand-based pricing mechanisms require identification of costs on a period (i.e.. daily)
basis that equates to capacity and demand within that period.
Identification and allocation of the costs associated with record communications are
complex because:
• Marginal costs are dependent on the transmission mode;
• Multiple facilities, each with varying costs, are used to accomplish record
communications; and
• Equipment has both joint and dedicated use.
For example, various transmission modes and systems employed appear to have
different marginal costs. A satellite communications system requires a huge capital
investment to establish the link and a seemingly small cost in manpower to operate the
system. Hence, it appears to have very low marginal cost. On the other hand, a high
frequency full period termination may record a greater cost in manpower producing a
higher marginal cost. Numerous facilities, located world-wide, are necessary to
accomplish the tasks of message acceptance, transmission and delivery. Some facilities
are geared to provide a specific type of acceptance (i.e., Naval Telecommunications
Centers) or a specific type of transmission (i.e., transmitter facility). These facilities may
not only have different types of costs, but also a different range of costs. Finally,
providing record communications is not a simple factor process. Messages are not tied
to specific pieces of equipment. All messages may use a particular system at some point
in their route, but the message will invariably use several other pieces of equipment
independently. Due to all the differences in transmission modes' systems, the myriad
facilities, and equipment, a method is necessary to separate and divide recorded costs
appropriately in order for the marginal cost of record communications to be determined.
C. BASIC FRAMEWORK
The complexity of the Naval Telecommunications System architecture and the
complexity of the associated costs create an infinite maze of information to determine
the cost of record communications. A "black box" approach provides a basic framework
to start the cost estimation process.
Viewed as a "black box", the NTS has inputs from and outputs to the users. Within
the "black box," a message may go through several electronic transformations and be
transmitted to several geographic areas. Regardless of how and where the message is
processed, funds are expended and can be traced to an individual command. All
commands within the black box, in aggregate, may provide the costs associated with
record communications.
Within the black box, numerous individual commands in the NTS can be depicted
(i.e.. Naval Communications Stations and Naval Telecommunications Centers). Each
command may have responsibility for one or more steps in providing record
communications. (The steps are accept, transmit and deliver.) The basic framework
allows identification of these steps, permitting segregation of the users and providers of
record communications. The basic framework for cost estimation is illustrated in
Figure 23 on page 41.
D. COST ESTIMATION MODEL
Using the basic framework, a cost model can be completed for each command within
the NTS. Data regarding costs must be collected and allocated.
1. Data
Any item resulting in a transfer of funds related directly or indirectly to record
communications must be identified. This includes such items as: leases, contracts,
utilities, manpower, consumables, and equipment. Additional data about each item
must also be recorded such as cost, acquisition date, and service life, to allow
appropriate allocation and accounting.
2. Allocation Groups
The model provides for both cost and processing step categories. Each item's





Figure 23. Basic Framework for Cost Estimation
on the objective of the cost estimation (i.e., price, cost benefit analysis), which goes
beyond the scope of this thesis.
a. Cost Allocation
Four cost allocation categories based on telephone literature [Ref. 19: p. 70
and 20: p. 192] are used. They allow identification of costs that are incurred universally
to messages, and costs that are incurred because of the particular mode/system of
transmission. Ultimately these categories will allow identification of average total costs
and marginal cost of sending messages via a particular system.
(I) Connectivity Cost. Because the NTS provides record
communications to a variety of users, multiple connectivity methods are used. The
equipment and costs directly attributable to its operation and maintenance are
connectivity costs. These costs are typically fixed. Each connectivity method (i.e.,
satellite, high frequency, and landline) must be identified, because each will produce a
different cost.
(2j Capacity. Typically fixed costs, the costs of providing service
regardless of connectivity means and demands placed on the system, are capacity costs.
The acquisition and maintenance cost of the NAVCOMPARS or LD.MX, systems used
by all messages (non-tactical), is an example of a capacity cost.
(3) Traffic. Costs incurred because a message is processed, irrespective
of mode, system or congestion, is a traffic cost. These costs are the marginal cost of
sending a message. Items include electrical power and operators' salaries.
f4) Overhead. Costs associated with record communication that are not
directly chargeable to the other categories, are overhead. These costs are typically fixed
and are incurred because of administration and management. The salary of division
officers, department heads, etc. and cost incurred because of research and development,
are examples of overhead.
b. Processing Step
The NTS accepts, transmits, and delivers messages; however, an individual
command within the NTS may be involved with only one step throughout the total
service. This requires annotation, for each item, of what step (accept, transmission, and
delivery) the item was used.
E. DATA COLLECTION
The process of collecting and allocating cost data will be an enormous task. The
data necessary to complete a cost estimation is not located in a central repository. For
instance, acquisition is a centralized process, whereas operating and supporting costs are
typically maintained by individual commands. Allocation of the data to the appropriate
cost allocation group (connectivity, capacity, traffic, overhead) will be open to individual
interpretation. Additionally, questions will arise as to the detail and applicability of data
(i.e., costs in support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff communication).
VI. FINDINGS
A. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this thesis was to examine alternative pricing mechanisms to
manage the demand and increase the efficiency of the NTS. It is the start of a very
difficult process of developing a pricing strategy for record communications.
B. FINDINGS
1. Targets for Demand Management
The NTS is a congestion-based system with three conceivable points of delay:
entry into the NTS, waiting transmission, and delivery. To effectively manage
congestion and delay, the following items must be targeted:
• number of messages (including number of addees):
• length of messages;
• arrival rate (volume in a time period); and
• precedence assignment.
2. Current Demand Management
An excess demand for record communications should normally be expected
because the price is set at zero and a capacity limitation exists.
Currently, demand for record communications is managed by administrative
procedures. The procedures are effective with regard to decreasing the volume of
messages. However, if the length, arrival rate, and precedence assignment of messages
are not minimized the speed of service objectives will continue to be exceeded, ceteris
paribus.
3. Speed of Delivery Data
Program SRPA, Traffic Analysis Reports, provides concrete reporting of delivery
speed. This information, however, is incomplete and somewhat misleading as to the
actual speed with which an individual message is delivered-writer to reader. The reports
are based on entry and exit from a particular NAVCOMPARS, which does not include
the delay waiting to enter the NAVCOMPARS nor delay to travel through other
necessary systems.
Handling time, which may be considered speed of delivery, is displayed on
summary reports as an average. Averages, however, do not reveal the number of
messages which exceed the speed of service objective, nor do they give an indication of
what the actual handling time is.
4. Pricing
Pricing, as a demand management tool, should increase the efficiency of the
NTS. The appropriate pricing mechanism is dependent upon the characteristics of
supply and demand. Cost-based and congestion-based pricing mechanisms capture the
cost of operation and delay, respectively. Demand-based pricing mechanisms are able
to maximize efficiency when fluctuations in demand occur.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
This thesis provides a foundation for pricing as a demand management tool. To
implement pricing, an actual dollar price must be determined. This requires an analysis
of supply, demand, and congestion. A dollar amount for a per unit delay cost must be
ascertained. If the characteristics of operations costs, demand, or congestion are
significant, the corresponding pricing mechanism must be used.
Implementation of a user-paid record communications system raises numerous
questions.
• How would users be allocated money to pay for a service that was previously free?
• How would the appropriate amount of money each command would receive for
record communications be determined?
• Who would pay for a message-the sender or the receiver?
• Would the accounting system, necessary to account for all users, be cost
prohibitive?
• If a command exceeded their budget, would the messase be sent? Who would pav
for it?
• Would vital information be lost because commands elected not to send a message?
• Would pricing as a demand management tool for record communications work?
The analysis of supply, demand and congestion, along with these questions, each a
separate topic of analysis, must be used to determine if a user-paid system would benefit
the U.S. Naw.
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